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Much ink has been spilled calling upon Europeans 
to do more for their defence in the context of the 
transatlantic relationship. “Everybody talks about 
the weather but nobody does anything about it”: it 
used to be a fitting expression for this conundrum 
– no more.  
The Strategic Compass process is an opportunity 
not only to decide what umbrellas to buy but when, 
how, and where to use them to protect against rain, 
hail, snow and even sunburn. There is a 
dissonance, however, between the political rhetoric 
about a complex and unpredictable security 
environment requiring a 360° defence and 
deterrence and the practice of measuring defence 
and deterrence. 
 There is also a dissonance between advocates for a 
clear focus on NATO’s core business of territorial 
defence or for a more comprehensive Alliance 
contribution to security. This brief makes an 
argument firmly in favour of the latter with a focus 
on Europe’s contribution. It argues that the 
Strategic Compass process can be an incubator for 
a credible European prototype for burden sharing. 
IF NOT NOW, WHEN? 
Europeans are binding themselves in common 
defence structures, they co-finance defence 
projects, and objectively assess their shared 
strategic environment. Since autumn 2020, they 
began debating the threats up to the 2030s with 
the intention of orientating themselves in a more 
troubled strategic environment.  
The EU and its Member States are feeling the 
spotlight moving away from the old continent and 
towards the new geopolitical epicentre in the Indo-
Pacific, while to Europe’s East and South trouble still 
reigns. Yet the circumstances could not be more 
favourable: EU defence initiatives are seeing 
implementation; the White House hosts a friendly 
pro-European president; NATO is in reflection 
mode; and Covid-19 has enlarged politicians’ grasp of 
the EU’s added value in providing security – be it for 
strategic or purely economic reasons.  
 
Henry Kissinger quotes President Nixon as regularly 
saying: “You pay the same price for doing something 
halfway as for doing it completely. So you might as 
well do it completely.”1 The Strategic Compass would 
only be complete if its findings make its way beyond 
the courageous realm of policy debates and into the 
 
 





treacherous one of policy results. The most tangible 
contribution it could bring is a solid European 
prototype for burden (or indeed, security) sharing that 
marries both the EU’s and NATO’s 2030 needs.  
 
The policy fringe that used to criticise NATO’s 2% 
defence spending metric has come closer to the 
mainstream. So much so that Secretary of State 
Antony Blinken himself spoke of “the need to adopt 
a more holistic view of burden sharing”, recognising 
that “no single number fully captures a country’s 
contribution to defending our collective security and 
interests”. (I will immodestly assume that he read the 
NATO 2030 Young Leaders report before his first 
visit to NATO and Brussels, in which my colleagues 
and I advocate a rethinking of burden sharing). 
Annalena Baerbock, Green Party candidate for 
German chancellor, equally doubts that the 2% is still 
the state of the art, proposing instead a focus “on what 
kind of capacity can Europe bring”. 
 
Besides being easy to communicate publicly and 
politically, the 2% metric does not offer much more. 
As I have argued before, the 2% of GDP goal 
measures quantity over quality, and fails to account for 
economic downturns, i.e. a post-pandemic economic 
slump that pushes the percentage up by default. Other 
analyses published by Egmont have pointed out how 
this metric might not even be in NATO’s interest 
since its simplicity disables any assessment of whether 
“military spending is actually directed at NATO 
objectives”. That is the case of US spending to 
advance its global, not only its transatlantic, interests. 
Even the UK did its own share of “creative defence 
accounting” to embellish its defence spending.2  
SIPRI – one of the main references for defence 
economics – also notes that in 2020 global military 
spending as a share of the GDP increased even 
though global GDP shrank by 4.4%. 
 
Being mindful of the NATO angle is essential for the 
legacy of the Strategic Compass. Because of the strict 
intergovernmental character of security and defence 
policy at the EU level and the mostly non-binding 
character of recent defence initiatives, the targets they 
set are barely reflected in Member States’ national 
defence planning. Instead, the manual of 21 EU 
Members is the NATO Defence Planning Process 
(NDPP). This is precisely why Strategic Compass 
architects should hold Secretary General Stoltenberg 
to his word and deepen EU-NATO cooperation, 
closely coordinating the new NATO Strategic 
Concept and NDPP political guidance that are in the 
works. For the Compass to leave a legacy that defence 
planners can implement, a synchronised dance 
between the two is necessary. The EU should be 
proactive in engaging NATO if it wants to seize the 
opportunity to redefine burden sharing in a way that 
better reflects European contributions and priorities. 
The June 2021 NATO and EU-US summits would 
be good occasions to put on the dancing shoes. 
 
FROM FREE-RIDING TO CO-PILOTING  
Secretary Blinken reasonably argued that when more of 
the burden is shouldered by allies, “a fair say in making 
decisions” will follow. If European strategic autonomy is 
about more self-reliance and independent action, then the 
Compass should be strategic in more than name. It 
should be used to fertilise the European pillar in NATO 
by gathering not only countries with double membership, 
but also non-Allied EU Member States (who mostly are 
close partners of the Alliance), as well as by consulting with 
allies such as Norway and, most particularly, the UK. If 
they are to respond to the needs of the security 
environment, Europeans should be capable not only of 
more robust (including high-risk) crisis management in 
the neighbourhood but also of freedom of navigation 
operations (as per the Indo-Pacific strategy) and of better 
supporting NATO’s territorial defence. A new metric 
should be more operational and strike a balance “between 
security and defence, people protection and power 
projection”, harmonising national and human security.2 
 
An alternative prototype to burden sharing is not a way to 
spend less and “free ride”. It is recognising the need to 
spend better. This trend is not solely European, but is 
 
 





visible across the Western alliance. Japanese officials fret 
about the “narrow” thinking in defence burden sharing, 
arguing instead for options which better account for 
Tokyo’s diverse regional contributions to defence and 
deterrence. Even the Biden administration’s Interim 
National Security Strategic Guidance recognises that domestic 
and external circumstances force the US to adopt a more 
expansive view of national security, balancing traditional 
and formerly non-traditional security challenges. The 
Biden administration has extended a hand to redefine 
burden sharing and Europeans should grab it. 
 
EU Member States spend around €190 billion on defence 
annually. But the EU’s wider contribution to Euro-
Atlantic peace and security is much larger. The EU’s 
budget for 2021-2027 provides around €110 billion for 
external policy, defence research and development and 
military mobility, plus an additional €5 billion for the 
European Peace Facility (to finance military operations 
and capacity-building, including military assistance).  
 
This amount includes a mammoth Neighbourhood, 
Development and International Cooperation Instrument, expenses 
under the Common Foreign and Security Policy, such as 
for civilian missions, and the European Defence Fund. 
These will altogether address issues ranging from 
stabilisation and conflict prevention to defence 
technologies and crisis response. The sum becomes even 
higher if one includes internal security, cyber and hybrid 
threats, as well as dual-use tech and space investments. In 
a context where Washington is reviewing its global force 
posture, expected to focus on the Indo-Pacific and China, 
and is withdrawing from Afghanistan, aren’t these 
contributions precisely what our neighbourhood needs?  
 
A closer look at the tally of contributions should give EU 
Members confidence in the self-standing of the Union 
and decrease their hesitation to upset Washington by 
tampering with the status quo. Washington itself is 
tampering with the status quo. This will not make for an 
easy debate, since the subject is divisive, but here too 
Secretary Blinken, in the same speech, invited allies “to 
have these tough conversations – and even to disagree”.  
A NEW STATUS QUO IS NOT A BAD THING 
As the Strategic Compass and the NATO 2030 
process have brought political leaders to the heart of 
an agora on policy ideas, Europeans should use this as 
an opportunity to design a modern metric. This goes 
hand in hand with the Compass’ objective of 
overcoming the agony over defining the meaning of 
strategic autonomy and of adapting the EU’s level of 
ambition. It can sandbox debates on security and non-
security contributions and on the potential of 
countries specialising in diverse defence niches. The 
Compass could even provide the necessary vision for 
putting together the EU defence puzzle (including 
new ideas about rapid entry forces) into EUFOR 
CROC – the PESCO project with the potential of 
shaping EU crisis management.  
 
Putting a prototype on the table could lay concrete 
groundwork for EU-NATO discussions about a 
division of labour (about which the Egmont Institute 
does not run short on proposals),4 it would 
demonstrate Europe’s seriousness, and would win 
points with NATO, provided they are consulted 
transparently. On the one hand, this would give the 
European pillar of NATO a chance to show its real 
contribution to transatlantic security. On the other, it 
would also give NATO a chance to identify ways in 
which it can provide its one-of-a-kind contribution to 
debates ranging from resilience and geoeconomics to 
climate change and crisis management, which is it very 
eager to do.  
 
This course of action would amount to a win-win. It 
is in NATO’s interest to be at this table while it works 
to identify its own future role, balancing non-
traditional security with its core territorial defence 
tasks. Likewise, it is also in the EU’s interest for 
NATO to be on board to ensure that national defence 
planners receive the same instructions from both 
organisations, instead of contradictory standards, 
criteria and, sometimes, priorities. This would help 
transatlantic allies to better define their respective roles 
across the crisis spectrum. 
 
 





Until now, the way that many in NATO and the US 
look at European defence efforts is best captured by 
the old joke that pictures two people in a restaurant. 
“Boy, the food at this place is really terrible”, says one. 
“Yeah, I know, and such small portions!", replies the 
other.   
 
With an administration in the White House that (so 
far) has not demanded burden sharing with one hand 
and rejected EU defence efforts with the other, the 
Strategic Compass can leave behind a legacy that is not 
limited to academic references but that sets the tone 
for a modern and balanced transatlantic alliance in 
2030. It can result in a concrete blueprint to maximise 
the EU’s civilian and military assets in 
complementarity with NATO and could therefore 
guide Europeans to realise that not only in trade, 
climate, and data protection, but in defence too, they 
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